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AUER 2.0:  THE DISUNIFORM APPLICATION OF 
AUER DEFERENCE AFTER KISOR V. WILKIE 
Daniel Lutfy* 
 
This Note examines how lower courts have applied Auer deference after 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor v. Wilkie.  The Court granted 
certiorari in Kisor to answer one question:  whether to overturn the 
deference regimes created by Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. and 
Auer v. Robbins.  The Court upheld the doctrines and clarified their reach, 
limits, and proper application.  This Note focuses on Kisor’s holding 
regarding the extent judges must scrutinize a regulation before concluding it 
is ambiguous.  Despite the Court’s attempt to explicate a standard, lower 
courts have demonstrated stark differences in regulatory interpretation 
before concluding a regulation is ambiguous for the purposes of Auer 
deference.  This Note highlights that disuniformity, explains its cause, and 
offers its own interpretation of Kisor v. Wilkie. 
This Note also identifies two causes of the disuniform application of Kisor.  
First, different judges have different ideas of what “ambiguity” means.  A 
regulation that is 75 percent clear may be ambiguous to some judges but 
unambiguous to others.  Without resolving this problem, the Court used 
conclusory terms to characterize the level of regulatory interpretation lower 
courts should engage in.  Those terms include “rigorous” and “exhaustive.”  
Two courts can engage in the same “rigorous” or “exhaustive” regulatory 
interpretation but disagree on whether the result of that process means a 
regulation is “ambiguous.” 
Second, the Court raised two competing values but did not clarify how to 
resolve them.  Competing with the requirement of “exhaustive” regulatory 
interpretation is the idea that a deference regime facilitates the judiciary’s 
respect for an agency’s policy discretion.  But how does a court exhaustively 
interpret a regulation and simultaneously defer to an agency’s policy 
discretion?  While the Court raised these two competing factors, it never 
clarified how they precisely interact. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine this:  you join the military at nineteen years old.  Three years later, 
you are stationed in Vietnam.1  You participate in Operation Harvest Moon.2  
 
 1. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2409 (2019). 
 2. Id. 
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At twenty-two years of age, you kill two enemy combatants.3  A friend dies.4  
The memory of both torments you.5  Seventeen years later, at a time of 
limited understanding of post-traumatic stress disorder,6 the Veterans 
Administration (VA) denies your disability benefits.7  Twenty-five years 
later, the VA recognizes your disability upon your submission for 
reconsideration.8  However, the VA refuses to apply your disability benefits 
retroactively based on the meaning of the word “relevant” in a complex 
regulatory scheme.9  You appeal to federal court, equipped with your best 
arguments to convince an independent judge.  However, you learn you have 
an uphill battle.  The judge defers to the VA’s interpretation of the regulation 
unless it is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”10  The 
court of appeals does not disagree with your interpretation or even try to 
analyze what the regulation means.11  Instead, the court holds that the 
“Board’s interpretation does not strike [it] as either plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the VA’s regulatory framework.”12  You lose.13 
Against this factual background, the U.S. Supreme Court considered 
overturning the deference regimes created by Auer v. Robbins14 and Bowles 
v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,15 under which courts defer to an agency’s 
interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations.16  The Court unanimously 
vacated the Federal Circuit’s decision but split 5-4 on whether to overturn 
Auer deference.17  Justice Kagan, writing for the majority, refashioned Auer 
deference by articulating new limits and tests for lower courts to apply.18  But 
in doing so, a plurality of the Court reaffirmed the merits of Auer deference 
as a matter of policy.19  Notably, the Court justified Auer deference on 
separation of powers grounds.20  Because Congress vests policy discretion in 
agencies, and because resolving ambiguities in regulations often entails 
policy discretion, a deference regime respects the policy choices Congress 
delegates to the executive branch.21 
 
 3. Brief for Petitioner at 14, Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (No. 18-15), 2019 
WL 338890, at *17. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 15. 
 7. Id. at 17. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 19. 
 10. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley 
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)). 
 11. Kisor v. Shulkin, 869 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2017), vacated sub nom. Kisor v. 
Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
 15. 325 U.S. 410 (1945). 
 16. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2409 (2019). 
 17. Id. 
 18. See id. at 2414. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id. at 2415. 
 21. Id. 
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In refashioning Auer deference, the Court also limited the circumstances 
where agencies deserve deference.22  One such requirement, which this Note 
focuses on, is that a regulation be “genuinely ambiguous” before a court 
accepts an agency’s interpretation.23  However, this Note shows that lower 
courts, in interpreting Kisor, have vastly different ideas regarding the 
meaning of genuine ambiguity.24 
These two issues—respect for the executive branch’s policy discretion and 
the meaning of genuine ambiguity—are central to this Note.  While the Court 
in Kisor cautioned lower courts to respect an agency’s policy discretion, it 
also commanded lower courts to rigorously interpret regulations to avoid the 
overapplication of deference.25  Kisor, therefore, has two competing values:  
respect for the executive branch and the power of the judiciary to determine 
issues of law.26  This Note addresses how lower courts have and should toe 
that delicate balance when deciding to apply Auer deference. 
Part I first gives the legal background for Auer and Seminole Rock 
deference.  Part II closely analyzes the majority and concurring opinions in 
Kisor.  Part III analyzes four lower court opinions that applied Kisor to 
demonstrate its inconsistent application.  Finally, Part IV weighs in on each 
lower court opinion, explains their divergent outcomes, and offers an 
explanation for the best reading of Kisor. 
I.  BACKGROUND OF AUER DEFERENCE 
Part I.A explains the basic concept of Auer deference by analyzing three 
cases that helped create the doctrine.  Part I.B turns to how the Court limited 
the application of the doctrine it created.  Part I.C explains arguments against 
Auer deference, and Part I.D highlights how judges openly called for the 
Court to overturn Auer long before Kisor. 
A.  Auer Deference Defined 
Few legal topics engender divisive scholarship like judicial deference to 
an agency’s interpretation of a statute or its own regulations.  Even the 
majority opinion in Kisor and the principal concurrence disagree on the 
doctrine’s origins.27  Therefore, rather than trying to unearth the history of 
Auer deference, this Note instead explains foundational cases that morphed 
the doctrine into its present state before Kisor.28 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 2416. 
 24. See infra Part III (showing how lower courts interpret Kisor differently, in part 
because each court has different ideas about the meaning of ambiguity). 
 25. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2410. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 2411, 2426. 
 28. For a historical perspective, see Sanne H. Knudsen & Amy J. Wildermuth, Unearthing 
the Lost History of Seminole Rock, 65 EMORY L.J. 47 (2015). 
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Understanding the deference regime created by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.29 is a useful starting point.30  There, 
the Court famously articulated the deference that courts should give to an 
agency’s interpretation of its enabling statute.31  The basis for Chevron 
deference is that Congress delegates power to agencies, not courts, to fill 
“gaps” left in a statute.32  And agencies, rather than courts, are politically 
capable of resolving policy issues.33  Therefore, agencies have the most 
discretion when an interpretation of statute involves weighing competing 
policy values.34  However, deference is only appropriate if Congress does not 
directly speak on the matter in question.35  And in making that judgment, 
courts should “utilize the traditional tools of statutory interpretation” to 
ascertain Congress’s intent.36  If Congress speaks clearly on the matter, then 
agencies do not deserve deference.37 
Auer deference occurs when a court defers to an agency’s interpretation of 
its own ambiguous regulation, as opposed to its interpretation of a statute.38  
Like Chevron deference, Auer deference is premised on the idea that the 
interpretation of a regulation involves “judgment grounded in policy 
concerns”39 and a “sensitivity to the proper roles of the political and judicial 
branches.”40  Because Congress delegates lawmaking authority to agencies, 
courts infer that Congress also delegates the power to agencies to resolve 
ambiguities in the laws it promulgates.41  One unique feature of Auer 
deference is the presumption that the agency will have greater knowledge 
and understanding of its own regulatory text than the courts.42 
 
 29. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 30. The Court in Kisor borrowed language from Chevron in refashioning Auer deference, 
namely that lower courts must “exhaust the traditional tools of statutory interpretation” before 
deciding an agency’s interpretation deserves deference. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416.  It is worth 
considering if the Court’s reference to Chevron signaled a merger between the two doctrines. 
 31. This is commonly understood as a two-step approach.  Courts must first determine if 
Congress has spoken directly on the issue and, if Congress has not, courts only determine if 
the agency based its interpretation on a permissible construction of the statute. See Chevron, 
467 U.S. at 843. 
 32. Id. at 843–44. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 844. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 833 n.9. 
 37. Id. at 833. 
 38. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2410 (2019). 
 39. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2412; see also Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1999) (“Because applying an agency’s regulation to complex or 
changing circumstances calls upon the agency’s unique expertise and policymaking 
prerogatives, we presume that the power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is a 
component of the agency’s delegated law making powers.”).  Solicitor General Noel 
Francisco, at oral argument for Kisor, called Martin’s statement about congressional intent the 
strongest ideological basis for Auer deference. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 59, Kisor, 
139 S. Ct. 2400 (No. 18-15). 
 42. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2412 (stating that agencies are in a better position than courts 
to “reconstruct” the meaning of a regulation). 
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The first collectively agreed reference to judicial deference to an agency’s 
regulations comes from dictum in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.43  
Seminole Rock was a manufacturer of crushed stone, which was a regulated 
commodity under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.44  In October of 
1941, Seminole Rock contracted to sell crushed stone at $0.60 per ton, and 
they delivered the stone in March of 1942.45  After the delivery, Seminole 
Rock wanted to charge the same buyer an increased price on a subsequent 
sale, but the administrator for the Office of Price Administration enjoined the 
sale.46  Maximum Price Regulation No. 188 provided that manufacturers of 
crushed stone could only make sales in March of 1942 at the same or a lower 
price as prior sales in the same month.47 
The government argued that, because Seminole Rock delivered the 
crushed stone at $0.60 per ton in March of 1942, the subsequent sale was 
subject to the regulation.48  Seminole Rock argued that the regulation only 
applied if the sheet rock was charged and delivered in March of 1942.  Since 
Seminole Rock charged the contractor almost a full year in advance, it argued 
the regulation should not apply.49 
The Supreme Court held that the delivery of crushed stone, as opposed to 
contract formation or when the charge occurred, triggered the regulation’s 
effect.50  The definition of “highest price charged during March, 1942” meant 
“the highest price which the seller charged to a purchaser . . . for delivery of 
the same class of material during March, 1942.”51  The definition made the 
delivery of the regulated commodity sufficient to trigger the regulation’s 
effects since it explicitly referred to delivery.52 
Prior to the Court’s textual analysis, the Court issued its famous dictum 
about the proper procedure to interpret an agency’s regulation, which became 
the basis for Auer deference: 
Since this involves an interpretation of an administrative regulation a court 
must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if 
the meaning of the words used is in doubt.  The intention of Congress or 
the principles of the Constitution in some situations may be relevant in the 
first instance in choosing between various constructions.  But the ultimate 
criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling 
weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.53 
 
 43. 325 U.S. 410 (1945). 
 44. Id. at 412. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 414. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 415. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 414. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 413–14 (emphasis added). 
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Despite the Court’s dictum, the Court independently analyzed the 
regulation and concluded the agency’s position was correct.54  In fact, the 
Court stated the agency’s interpretation was “consistent” with its own 
independent analysis, which suggests that reference to the agency’s 
interpretation was simply a way to buttress the Court’s position.55  
Nevertheless, this dictum is the first clear iteration of the modern Auer 
doctrine that the Court considered overturning in Kisor. 
The most significant case after Seminole Rock is Auer v. Robbins56 itself.  
The plaintiffs, members of a police force, argued that the City of St. Louis 
improperly withheld overtime pay in violation of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act of 1938 (FLSA).57  The FLSA required overtime pay unless an employee 
received a salary, and his employer could not deduct his pay based on 
variances in quality and quantity of work.58  The plaintiffs claimed they were 
subject to disciplinary procedures related to the “quality or quantity” of their 
work.59 
The secretary of labor submitted an amicus brief, in which he distinguished 
between disciplinary reductions in pay and disciplinary adjustments, where 
an official is reassigned, terminated, or demoted after a disciplinary 
proceeding.60  The secretary believed that an employee must be subject to 
discipline resulting in reductions in pay in the normal course of business, not 
just as a response to a singular instance of misconduct.61  The secretary 
believed the plaintiffs did not meet that standard because police officers 
normally face discipline because of “one-time incident[s].”62 
The Court, unlike in Seminole Rock, deferred to the secretary’s 
interpretation before performing its own textual analysis.63  Instead of 
analyzing the regulation, the Court simply stated that the secretary 
permissibly interpreted the regulation.64  The Court never considered another 
 
 54. See Ronald A. Cass, Auer Deference:  Doubling Down on Delegation’s Defects, 87 
FORDHAM L. REV. 531, 550 (2018) (arguing that the Court “obviously would have reached the 
same result in Seminole Rock with or without deference”).  Cass further argues that Seminole 
Rock is the most compelling case for administrative deference because the interpretation (1) 
was during wartime about a wartime matter, (2) was made when the agency promulgated the 
regulation and therefore the agency was positioned to reconstruct the regulation’s meaning, 
(3) was widespread, and (4) was consistently applied. See id.  In that context, Cass argues that 
it is hard to imagine the broad dictum in Seminole Rock was meant to justify the modern form 
of deference that exists today. See id. at 534. 
 55. Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 417. 
 56. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).  There is a lot of intervening history that is disputed but, for the 
purposes of this Note, it is not relevant. 
 57. Id. at 455. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 461. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 460. 
 63. See id. at 462 (holding that the secretary’s interpretation deserved deference because 
it was a reasonable interpretation).  The Court did not determine if the secretary’s reading was 
the “best” reading, like it did in Seminole Rock. See Cass, supra note 54, at 547 (arguing that 
the Court in Auer relied on a deference regime instead of its own regulatory interpretation). 
 64. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461. 
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interpretative argument.65  This method of applying deference dramatically 
differed from what happened in Seminole Rock, but it became the foundation 
for regulatory deference moving forward.66 
As case law developed, the Court’s formulation of Auer deference 
sharpened.  At its height, the Court used the doctrine to avoid getting in the 
weeds of regulatory interpretation.67  In Decker v. Northwest Environmental 
Defense Center,68 the Court stated that an agency’s interpretation of a 
regulation deserves deference, even if inferior to its adversary’s 
interpretation.69  That iteration of deference toward agencies is a far cry from 
the application of deference in Seminole Rock.70  This Note addresses, in part, 
how Kisor’s formulation of Auer deference represents a shift from the 
Court’s prior iterations of Auer in Decker.71 
B.  Limitations on the Application of Auer Deference 
While Auer deference became a powerful tool, the Court has imposed 
judicially created limits on its application.72  First, Auer deference is not 
warranted if the agency’s ambiguous regulation is just a restatement of the 
statute creating the agency or granting it powers.73  Second, Auer deference 
is inappropriate when an interpretation of a regulation does not reflect the 
agency’s fair and considered judgment.74  An interpretation that conflicts 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. See Cass, supra note 54, at 548–49.  Specifically, the Court stated that the secretary’s 
view “cannot be said to be unreasonable.” Auer, 519 U.S. at 459.  Unlike in Seminole Rock, 
where the agency’s interpretation was “consistent” with the Court’s reasoning, the Court in 
Auer cloaked the secretary of labor’s interpretation as “reasonable” according to a nonexistent 
underlying standard. Id.  That is, no underlying regulatory analysis defined the bounds of 
reasonableness. Id.  This method of applying Auer deference justifies deference to an agency’s 
interpretation of a regulation by nothing more than the ipse dixit of the court.  According to 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, an expert cannot draw conclusions based on data without 
explaining his reasoning; in other words, courts will not accept conclusions “only by the ipse 
dixit of the expert.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).  Similarly, courts 
should explain why a regulation is ambiguous and why an agency’s interpretation is 
reasonably within the zone of ambiguity. 
 67. See United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872 (1977) (deferring to the government 
because of the existence of regulations without engaging in interpretation). 
 68. 568 U.S. 597 (2013). 
 69. See id. at 613 (“It is well established that an agency’s interpretation need not be the 
only possible reading of a regulation—or even the best one—to prevail.”). 
 70. See Cass, supra note 54, at 561. 
 71. There are several iterations of the Auer rule that the Court proffered before Kisor 
which excuse courts from difficult regulatory interpretation. See, e.g., Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. 
Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 274–75 (2009) (“The agency’s interpretation 
is not ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation’; and so we accept it as correct.” 
(quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 461)).  The Court “accepted” the interpretation as correct rather 
than, as the Court did in Seminole Rock, conclude the agency’s interpretation was “consistent” 
with its own independent interpretation. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 72. Most, if not all, of these limitations are difficult to apply universally because the 
exceptions raise more questions than they answer. See Kristin E. Hickman & Mark R. 
Thomson, The Chevronization of Auer, 103 MINN. L. REV. 103, 105–06 (2019). 
 73. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (holding that a regulation that 
“parrots” a statute is undeserving of Auer deference). 
 74. Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012). 
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with a prior interpretation, or is merely a “convenient litigating position,” 
will not receive Auer deference.75  Third, Auer deference is inappropriate if 
the agency’s interpretation amounts to an “unfair surprise” which disrupts 
the regulated parties’ expectations about the law.76  Lastly, since Auer 
deference is premised on an agency’s superior expertise, it may be 
inappropriate when the regulations involve legal concepts rather than a 
choice between competing policy values.77 
C.  Arguments Against Auer Deference 
Since Kisor squarely confronted the question of whether to overturn Auer 
deference, it is worth considering the general arguments against it.78  
Arguments against Auer deference track three lines:  (1) statutory, (2) 
constitutional, and (3) policy. 
First, deference to administrative agencies may conflict with the 
Administrative Procedure Act.  5 U.S.C. § 706 directs the judiciary to 
“decide all relevant questions of law.”79  Despite that directive, Auer 
deference holds that agencies, not courts, authoritatively resolve ambiguities 
in their regulations.80 
Second, when the executive branch weighs in on the interpretative process, 
it invades the judiciary’s power to say what the law is.81  In a normal case or 
controversy, a judge independently adjudicates a dispute between two 
litigants.82  But when an agency seeks deference, a judge delegates his Article 
III power to one of the parties,83 and one of those parties is often the 
executive branch.84  This amounts to a violation of separation of powers.85  
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Romero v. Barr, 937 F.3d 292, 295 (4th Cir. 2019) (refusing to apply Auer deference 
for that reason). 
 77. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2442–43 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) 
(explaining that agency expertise is not a talisman for applying Auer deference because a court 
should consider the agency’s expertise in Skidmore deference).  Moreover, Justice Gorsuch 
argued that judges are capable of sifting through complicated regulatory schemes and issues 
without reflexively relying on deference as a substitute for thoughtful analysis. See id. at 2443. 
 78. For arguments supporting Auer deference, see infra Part II.B. 
 79. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency 
Interpretation of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 621 (1996). 
 80. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 110 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
Moreover, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that deference regimes skirt the notice-and-comment 
requirements for informal rulemaking because agencies can pass binding rules under Auer 
deference instead. See id. (noting that agencies are supposed to use notice-and-comment 
rulemaking to pass binding rules). 
 81. See id. at 124 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Justice Kagan rejected the argument that Auer deference violated separation of powers 
principles because the limits she imposed on the doctrine retained for the judiciary a proper 
interpretive role. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2421 (2019). 
 84. Judicial deference can arise in a case between two private litigants when an agency 
files an amicus brief. 
 85. Accord Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d. 1142, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, 
J., concurring) (stating that Auer deference “certainly seems to have added prodigious new 
powers to an already titanic administrative state”); see Manning, supra note 79, at 682 (“The 
concerns about unchecked power that animate the separation norm surely have no less, and 
2020 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
Moreover, unlike the judiciary, the executive branch lacks the structural 
protections afforded by Article III to federal judges, such as salary protection 
or lifetime tenure, which subjects the executive branch to shifting political 
motivations.86 
Third, Auer deference may be unwarranted because the political elements 
of administrative agencies shift from administration to administration.87  A 
core basis for Auer deference is that an agency is better situated to resolve an 
ambiguity than the judiciary because of its expertise.88  However, agency 
personnel changes frequently, and an agency’s focus in implementing the law 
changes as presidential administrations change.89  Just as a later Congress’s 
actions have no bearing on what an enacting Congress meant or intended in 
a statute, an agency’s postenactment interpretation of a regulation does not 
offer insight to the enacting agency’s intent.90 
D.  Open Calls to Overturn Auer Deference 
Doubts about Auer surfaced in various opinions leading to Kisor.  Justice 
Antonin Scalia, who wrote the unanimous opinion in Auer, directly called for 
overturning the doctrine in a 2012 concurrence.91  Three justices in Perez v. 
Mortgage Bankers Ass’n92 openly called for a future case that presented the 
question of whether to overrule Auer deference.93  In 2016, Justice Thomas 
dissented from a denial of a writ of certiorari and explicitly asked the Court 
to consider overruling Auer deference.94  Similarly, in 2016, then Judge 
Gorsuch concurred in a Tenth Circuit opinion, suggesting that the Court 
overturn Auer and Chevron deference.95  He echoed many of the arguments 
made by Justice Scalia and foreshadowed the arguments in his Kisor 
 
perhaps far more, purchase in a complex twentieth-century society whose government 
pervades our daily lives in a way that few could have imagined in 1787.”); see also Phillip B. 
Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the “Doctrine” of Separation of Powers, 85 MICH. L. REV. 592, 
601 (1986). 
 86. See Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. at 124 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 87. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2441 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 88. See id. at 2412 (majority opinion). 
 89. See id. at 2441 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 90. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the premise “that the correctness of statutory construction is to be measured by 
what the current Congress desires, rather than by what the law as enacted meant”).  Justice 
Scalia pointed out that legislative deals rely on quid pro quos, so the judiciary cannot look in 
isolation as to what a certain majority “wants” because the majority must always give and take 
certain provisions or aspects of a new law to get it passed.  See id. 
 91. Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 616 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 92. 575 U.S. 92 (2015). 
 93. Justices Scalia and Thomas called for Auer to be overturned, while Justice Alito did 
not pass judgment but “await[ed] a case in which the validity of Seminole Rock may be 
explored through full briefing and argument.” Id. at 108 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 94. See United Student Air Funds, Inc. v. Bible, 136 S. Ct. 1607, 1608 (2016) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (collecting opinions arguing to overturn Auer deference). 
 95. Gutierrez-Bruizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring). 
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concurrence.96  Most recently, federal appellate judges called for the Court 
to overturn Auer deference while Kisor was pending on appeal.97  Rancor 
from lower courts and even the Court itself set the stage for a case like Kisor 
to be decided. 
II.  THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN KISOR V. WILKIE:  AUER TESTED AT 
THE SUPREME COURT 
A.  The Majority and Plurality Opinions 
Justice Kagan authored a four-part opinion.98  After recounting the factual 
background of the case, the Court explained Auer deference and justified the 
doctrine on ideological grounds.99  The Court then acknowledged the various 
circumstances in which Auer deference is unwarranted.100  Chief Justice 
Roberts, who concurred and was the fifth vote to uphold the doctrine, joined 
in the part of the Court’s opinion that limited Auer deference but did not join 
in the part of the Court’s opinion that justified Auer deference on ideological 
grounds.101 
After justifying Auer deference, the Court rejected Kisor’s arguments on 
statutory, policy, and constitutional grounds.102  A plurality of the Court 
upheld Auer deference for several reasons, but a majority, created by Chief 
Justice Roberts, upheld it only on stare decisis grounds.103  Therefore, a 
majority of the Court agreed only on the limitations on the application of 
Auer deference and on its survival based on stare decisis.104 
B.  Justifying Auer Deference 
Justice Kagan, for the plurality, identified the context where Auer 
deference thrives:  where a regulation is genuinely ambiguous and the 
resolution of that ambiguity requires policy decision-making rather than 
textual or statutory interpretation.105  One of the four examples she cited 
involved a regulation that required arenas to ensure the disabled had 
comparable lines of sight to the general public.106  The issue presented was 
whether arenas, in ensuring “lines of sight comparable” for the disabled, had 
 
 96. Compare id. at 1153 (“[T]he problem remains that courts are not fulfilling their duty 
to interpret the law . . . .”), with Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2439 (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring) (finding that Auer deference “compromise[s] our judicial independence”). 
 97. See Forrest Gen. Hosp. v. Azar, 926 F.3d 221, 228 (5th Cir. 2019); United States v. 
Havis, 907 F.3d 439, 441 (6th Cir. 2018) (Thapar, J., concurring), rev’d en banc, 927 F.3d 382 
(6th Cir. 2019). 
 98. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2408. 
 99. Id. at 2410. 
 100. Id. at 2414. 
 101. Id. at 2424 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 102. Id. at 2421–22 (majority opinion). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 2410. 
 106. Id. 
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to consider standing spectators.107  Because the text of the regulation did not 
answer this problem and the resolution of the ambiguity required policy 
considerations, this situation exemplified appropriate deference to an 
agency’s policy discretion.108 
Next, Justice Kagan affirmed the presumption that Congress wants 
agencies, not courts, to resolve ambiguities in regulations.109  She 
acknowledged that Congress never explicitly assigned that responsibility to 
agencies.110  But since Congress delegated lawmaking authority to the 
agencies, the Court inferred that Congress also wanted agencies to resolve 
ambiguities in the regulations they promulgate.111 
The Court then explained the ideological justification for that 
presumption.112  Agencies are better positioned than courts to “reconstruct” 
a regulation’s original meaning.113  The agency’s insight can provide clarity 
on the rule’s original intent.114  If an interpretive question presents a new 
problem that the agency could not have predicted, then the agency’s specific 
intention is still useful to consider the similar issues the drafters faced.115 
More importantly for the purposes of this Note, the Court stressed that 
Auer deference is grounded on the premise that resolving regulatory 
ambiguity involves judgment of policy considerations.116  In reference back 
to the sports arena example, Justice Kagan noted the cost-benefit calculation 
an agency would consider to resolve the question.117  An agency would have 
to consider the cost to arenas of creating comparable lines of sight for the 
disabled that take into account standing spectators and then compare that to 
the goal of equal treatment for the disabled.118  The cost-benefit analysis 
“sound[ed] more in policy than in law.”119 
Judges might also have no familiarity or experience in the policy 
considerations agencies must consider to resolve a regulatory ambiguity.120  
Agencies often have greater expertise than judges, either because of scientific 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id.  For example, an agency had to consider the purpose of the regulation (to benefit 
the disabled) in conjunction with the financial considerations of the arenas (how much it would 
cost the arenas to consider standing spectators). Id.  To the plurality, the answer to that 
consideration “sounded more in policy than law.” Id. 
 109. Id. at 2412. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 2413. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id.  The difficulty in applying Justice Kagan’s opinion is figuring out which 
interpretative problems “sound more in policy than in law.” See infra Part IV.E. 
 120. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2413. 
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or technical knowledge.121  Congress tasks agencies to use their expertise to 
fill in statutory gaps, and a deference regime effectuates that intent.122 
Justice Kagan closed out this section with a policy argument.  Auer 
deference allows uniformity in the interpretation of regulations.123  Judges 
are likely to interpret regulations differently because of their lay perspective, 
whereas an agency speaks with one voice.124  In Auer itself, the circuit courts 
of appeals came to divergent conclusions regarding whether police officers 
deserved overtime pay.125  Therefore, Auer deference serves an import role 
in the uniformity of federal regulatory law.126 
C.  Limitations on Auer Deference 
The Court, now with a majority of justices, provided a five-part test that a 
regulation must pass to warrant the application of Auer deference.127  This 
Note focuses only on the first two parts of the test.  Before giving the test, 
the Court noted that, in the past, it applied Auer deference reflexively, 
without any interpretive analysis of the underlying regulation.128  This 
practice gave Kisor “a bit of grist for his claim” that Auer deference grants 
agencies too much authority.129  After that acknowledgement, Justice Kagan 
assured that the subsequent limitations on Auer deference avoided the 
problems Kisor raised.130 
First, a regulation must be genuinely ambiguous.131  To determine whether 
a regulation is ambiguous, courts should “exhaust all the traditional tools of 
statutory interpretation.”132  A court cannot conclude that a regulation is 
ambiguous unless it empties its “legal toolkit” and there is still no correct 
interpretive answer.133  The “legal toolkit” involves considering a 
regulation’s text, structure, and history.134  A regulation is not ambiguous 
merely because its resolution requires difficult interpretative analysis since 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. See id. 
 123. Id. at 2414. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.  For Auer deference, the five-part test requires that (1) a regulation is genuinely 
ambiguous, (2) the agency’s interpretation is within the “zone of ambiguity,” (3) the agency’s 
interpretation is its official position, (4) the agency’s interpretation implicates its expertise, 
and (5) the agency’s interpretation reflects its “fair and considered” judgment. See id. at 2415–
17. 
 128. Id. at 2414.  One example of this practice is from Auer itself. See supra note 68 and 
accompanying text. 
 129. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2414. 
 130. Id. at 2415.  It is a fair inference that, if the Court acknowledged that a method of 
applying Auer deference justified arguments that Auer deference is unconstitutional, then the 
Court probably did not endorse that method of Auer’s application.  Therefore, Kisor should 
be read to repudiate the application of Auer deference without a court’s independent analysis 
of the underlying regulation. See infra note 135 and accompanying text. 
 131. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415. 
 132. See id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
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thorough analysis can resolve purported ambiguities.135  However, Justice 
Kagan never clarified what “ambiguous” means or how ambiguous a 
regulation must be to proceed to the next step of analysis.136 
But in engaging in genuine regulatory interpretation, courts should not 
invade an agency’s policy discretion.137  Here, Justice Kagan differentiated 
between “law” and “policy” without defining either term.138  When a court 
fully utilizes its legal toolkit and has cannot come to an interpretative answer, 
“the law runs out, and policy-laden choice is what is left over.”139  This 
implies that courts should not declare that a regulation is ambiguous until 
they analyze the underlying regulation.140  Courts are to determine legal 
questions relating to regulations, but agencies have discretion to administer 
policy.  Simply put, if a court cannot come to an interpretative answer, the 
problem sounds in policy rather than law.141  But the Court ultimately gave 
no guidance about the precise contours of “policy” and “legal” questions, so 
lower courts have to determine which questions are more appropriately 
answered by agencies and which questions the judiciary retains power to 
adjudicate. 
If a court decides that a regulation is ambiguous, even after it has emptied 
its legal toolkit, it must be satisfied that the agency’s interpretation is within 
the “zone of ambiguity.”142  This is because, although a regulation might be 
ambiguous, the agency’s interpretive choice might be an unreasonable 
conclusion despite the ambiguity.143  The interpretive analysis in step one 
creates the outer limits of reasonability in step two.144  And the Court ensured 
that this is a step an agency can fail.145 
 
 135. See id. (“A regulation is not ambiguous merely because ‘discerning the only possible 
interpretation requires a taxing inquiry.’  To make that effort, a court ‘must carefully consider 
the text, structure, history, and purpose of a regulation, in all the ways it would if it had no 
agency to fall back on.’” (quoting Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 707 (1991) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting))).  This excerpt strongly suggests that lower courts should perform an 
interpretive analysis before and independent of any Auer analysis. 
 136. This is problematic because judges will disagree about whether to apply Auer 
deference because they have different understandings of the meaning of “ambiguity.”  A 
regulation could be ambiguous if it is 90 percent clear, 75 percent clear, or 50 percent clear, 
depending on the personal opinion of the adjudicator. See generally Ward Farnsworth et al., 
Ambiguity About Ambiguity:  An Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation, 2 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 257 (2010). 
 137. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id.  Justice Gorsuch argues that a judge will always come to an answer for any 
interpretative problem, no matter how difficult the process is or if one interpretation is 
narrowly better than another. See id. at 2429–30 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (arguing that legal 
arguments are never in equipoise). 
 142. Id. at 2416 (majority opinion). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id.  The inescapable conclusion, therefore, is that lower courts should perform an 
interpretive analysis even if they decide that a regulation is ambiguous.  The interpretive 
analysis is necessary to determine if an agency’s interpretation of its regulation is within the 
zone of ambiguity. 
 145. See id. 
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Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Alito 
concurred in the judgment but supported overturning Auer deference.146  
While Justice Gorsuch made several arguments—ranging from statutory to 
constitutional to policy—this section focuses on his arguments related to the 
first two steps of the test to apply Auer deference. 
Justice Gorsuch argued that the first requirement of Auer deference, that a 
regulation be genuinely ambiguous, is an amorphous concept incapable of 
consistent application.147  The Court has never defined what “ambiguity” 
means and how ambiguous a regulation must be to go to the next step.148  
Justice Gorsuch cited to a book review written by then Judge Kavanaugh in 
2016.149  In it, Kavanaugh argued that judges have different thresholds of 
ambiguity.150  If he concluded a statute was 65 percent clear, he would 
conclude the regulation is clear, but other judges might conclude that it was 
ambiguous.151  And no case or doctrine indicates which conclusion is 
correct.152  To Justice Gorsuch, this confusion invariably causes disuniform 
application of Auer deference.153 
Justice Gorsuch also highlighted that Auer deference is only meaningful if 
it compels a court to defer to an agency’s interpretation and the agency’s 
interpretation is otherwise incorrect.154  Since step one of Kisor requires 
rigorous statutory interpretation, a court should be able to determine the 
superior interpretation.155  But if a court decides in step one that the agency 
interpreted the regulation correctly, Auer deference is not applied.156  It is 
only applied if the agency’s interpretation is incorrect and the regulation is 
ambiguous enough to warrant deference nonetheless.157  This, to Justice 
Gorsuch, violates constitutional precepts of separation of powers.158 
Meanwhile, Chief Justice Roberts provided the key fifth vote to uphold 
Auer deference.159  However, he did not envision that Auer deference could 
 
 146. Id. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 2430. 
 149. See id. at 2430 n.34 (citing Brett Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 
HARV. L. REV. 2116 (2016) (book review)); see also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to 
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 520 (stating that the fundamental 
flaw in deference regimes is that there is no definition of ambiguity). 
 150. Brett Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2116, 2134–44 
(2016) (book review). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2430 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 154. Id. at 2429.  Justice Gorsuch does not believe legal arguments are ever in “true 
equipoise,” and a court can always use interpretive tools to come to an answer, even if the 
right interpretation comes after a difficult interpretive inquiry. See id. 
 155. Id.  This is because courts across the country, across a host of legal issues, manage to 
come to answers every day on difficult legal issues. Id.  There is no reason why regulatory 
interpretation is any different. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 2424 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
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be used to save a failing agency interpretation.160  He stated that the distance 
between Justice Kagan’s and Justice Gorsuch’s opinions was “not as great as 
it may initially appear,” even though one opinion called for upholding the 
doctrine and one called for overturning it.161  This is because, while Justice 
Gorsuch concluded that agency expertise should merely have persuasive 
power, the limits on Auer’s scope reduced it to situations where the agency’s 
interpretation would be persuasive and it would be unreasonable for a court 
to conclude otherwise.162  But, as Justice Gorsuch pointed out, this 
interpretation of Kisor would render Auer deference meaningless because it 
would only apply when a judge is otherwise persuaded of the agency’s 
interpretation.163  It would be pointless to have such a deference regime.164 
Justice Kavanaugh concurred, making one relevant criticism of Justice 
Kagan’s distinction between law and policy.165  Regulations that require 
policy analysis use terms like “reasonable,” “appropriate,” “feasible,” or 
“practical.”166  He agreed that analysis of those regulations requires a court 
to consider policy.167  But courts should not resolve those policy questions 
under the auspice of Auer deference.168  Auer deference should be restricted 
to legal interpretation, not considerations of policy.169  Using that distinction, 
he concluded that a judge can simultaneously engage in “rigorous scrutiny” 
of an ambiguous regulation under Auer deference, while deferring to an 
agency’s policy choices using the standard of review in Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co.170 
III.  APPLICATION OF KISOR IN THE LOWER COURTS 
Application of Kisor in the lower courts, regardless of the disposition, can 
be categorized into three groups of reasoning171:  (1) decisions that do not 
engage in rigorous regulatory analysis before concluding that the regulation 
is ambiguous for the purposes of Auer deference; (2) decisions that engage 
in rigorous statutory interpretation of regulations that use policy-laden terms 
like “appropriate” or “necessary” before deciding whether to apply Auer 
deference; and (3) decisions that engage in statutory interpretation of 
regulations that do not use policy-laden terms. 
 
 160. See id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 2424–25. 
 163. See id. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 164. Id. 
 165. See id. at 2448 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 
 166. Id. at 2448–49. 
 167. Id. at 2449. 
 168. See id. (stating that policy review of an agency’s actions is governed by Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)).  This is commonly known as State Farm review. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. These are categories this Note creates. 
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A.  Decisions That Do Not Rigorously Analyze a Regulation Before 
Applying Auer Deference 
1.  Trawler Carolina Lady, Inc. v. Ross 
Courts sometimes recognize a difficult conflict between two competing 
interpretations and conclude that the regulation is ambiguous because of that 
conflict.  One example of this practice, in Trawler Carolina Lady, Inc. v. 
Ross,172 involved sea scallop regulation in North Carolina.173  The plaintiff 
challenged the denial of his application to transfer scallop fishing permits.174  
Congress empowered the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to 
regulate overfishing.175  For scallop fishing, the NMFS instituted a “limited 
access” system, which drastically reduced the amount of new vessels 
permitted to fish scallops.176  The limited permit included a “days at sea” 
limitation (DAS), which was defined as “each 24-hour period of time during 
which a fishing vessel is absent from port for purposes of scallop fishing.”177 
In this case, the plaintiff sold a vessel to another company, whose president 
appeared to have familial or personal ties to the plaintiff.178  The plaintiff, 
however, retained the vessel’s permit and DAS allocation and fished for 
scallops with another vessel using that permit.179  The buyer used his own 
permit and DAS allocation for the vessel he bought from the plaintiff.180  
Then, the plaintiff transferred the permit he had retained to another vessel he 
owned that was damaged the previous year.181  After the plaintiff 
repurchased the vessel he originally sold, he attempted to transfer the permit 
back to that vessel.182 
The agency denied the transfer because of “the apparent lack of full 
consideration” and “the historical pattern of maneuvering permits” between 
the two companies.183  Specifically, the agency pointed to 50 C.F.R. 
§ 648.14(i)(2)(iv)(B), which makes it unlawful for “any one person” to 
“combine, transfer, or consolidate DAS allocations.”184 
The parties disputed what “any one person” meant.185  The plaintiff relied 
on a 1994 opinion letter from the agency that drew a distinction between a 
“person” consolidating a DAS allocation and a “vessel” consolidating a DAS 
 
 172. No. 4:19-CV-19, 2019 WL 3213537 (E.D.N.C. July 16, 2019). 
 173. See generally id. 
 174. Id. at *1. 
 175. Id. at *3. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at *4. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. In a July 2018 decision letter, the agency interpreted “any one person” to include 
transfers between vessels. Id. at *5. 
 185. Id. 
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allocation.186  Using that distinction, the plaintiff argued that the regulation 
only prohibited consolidating multiple DAS allocations in one vessel.187  It 
did not prohibit a vessel from fishing under two different DAS allocations 
after the first was expended.188  Therefore, the sole question was whether the 
regulation prohibited a vessel from fishing under different DAS allocations 
or whether it only prohibited consolidating multiple DAS allocations in one 
vessel.189 
The plaintiff cited two different regulations to support his argument.190  
The regulations provided that an owner who is issued a permit is limited to 
one replacement vessel per year and that permits are presumed to transfer 
vessels whenever they are bought and sold.191  Those two regulations implied 
that a vessel may fish under two different DAS allocations at different times 
and thus the agency improperly denied the plaintiff’s DAS transfer.192 
The court, however, deferred to the agency’s interpretation of the 
regulation.193  The court cited the two conflicting principles from Kisor.194  
While courts presume that Congress intends for agencies to resolve their 
ambiguities, they cannot ignore the plain language of a regulation.195  The 
court stated it did not need to apply Auer deference to determine that the 
agency had the authority to deny the plaintiff’s application.196  But it did 
apply Auer deference in response to the conflict created by the two 
regulations that the plaintiff cited.197 
The court held the regulations cited by the plaintiff did not 
“unambiguously require a different result” but created, at best, a “genuine 
ambiguity” calling for Auer deference.198  The two regulations did not cross-
reference the general prohibition on DAS allocations so the structure of the 
regulatory scheme was ambiguous.199  Although the two regulations cited by 
the plaintiff suggested a vessel could have multiple permits, they did not 
clearly limit the scope of the general prohibition against DAS allocation.200  
And without that clear interaction, the effect of the general prohibition on 
DAS allocation was ambiguous.  The court did not undertake an independent 
 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at *12. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See id. at *13. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id.  The Western District of Virginia imposed a similar burden in Spencer v. 
Macado’s, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 3d 545, 552 (W.D. Va. 2019).  There, the court held that a 
regulation was genuinely ambiguous because the regulation did not “unambiguously” define 
a word in the regulation. Id. 
 199. Trawler, 2019 WL 3213537, at *13. 
 200. Id. 
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analysis of the regulatory structure before its application of Auer 
deference.201 
In the next paragraph, the court held that the regulation’s text, structure, 
and context supported the agency’s reading.202  But it held that only after 
stating the plaintiff’s arguments did not “unambiguously foreclose” the 
agency’s position.203  Therefore, it is unclear whether the court 
independently analyzed the regulation or analyzed it only to the extent 
necessary to determine whether to apply Auer deference.204  Even if the court 
made those conclusions independent of Auer deference, it never resolved 
how the regulations that plaintiff cited influenced the meaning of the general 
prohibition on DAS allocations.205 
2.  Wolfington v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic Associates II PC 
The Third Circuit in Wolfington v. Reconstructive Orthopaedic Associates 
II PC206 deferred to an agency’s interpretation of a regulation without 
interpreting the underlying regulation itself.207  In this case, the plaintiff 
alleged a violation of the Truth in Lending Act of 1968 by failing to provide 
certain disclosures before lending the plaintiff credit.208  The plaintiff 
underwent surgery and, prior to the surgery, he signed an agreement that 
stated he would pay his deductible before the operation.209  The day before 
his surgery, he told his doctor that he could not pay.210  Both parties agreed 
orally that the plaintiff would pay his deductible through a payment plan of 
$100 per month after a $200 down payment.211  Although it was an oral 
agreement, the defendant sent a confirmation e-mail to the plaintiff.212 
The pertinent regulation (“Regulation Z”) required a “creditor” to make 
certain disclosures before the “consummation” of a credit transaction but 
only if the parties used a “written agreement.”213  The parties disputed the 
meaning of “written agreement.”214  The plaintiff argued that “emails either 
constitute a writing for purposes of [the regulation] or are indicative of a 
separate written agreement between the parties.”215  The Federal Reserve 
Board (the “Board”) believed that a written credit agreement requires more 
 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. 935 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2019). 
 207. See generally id. 
 208. Id. at 193. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 196. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 203. 
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than an “informal workout arrangement” of a debt, which cannot include “a 
letter that merely confirms an oral agreement.”216 
The court first discussed the Board’s longstanding interpretation of the 
requirements of a written agreement.217  Namely, the Board always required 
a level of formality and for the agreement to be “executed by the 
customer.”218  The email confirmation sent to the plaintiff was not “formal” 
and the plaintiff did not execute or sign the agreement.219  Rather, his father 
negotiated the payment plan.220  Therefore, if the court deferred to the 
agency, the plaintiff would lose.221 
Without independently interpreting the regulation, the court concluded 
that the Board’s interpretation of Regulation Z deserved deference.222  The 
court began by citing Kisor for the proposition that Congress wants agencies 
to play the primary role in interpreting ambiguous regulations.223  It also 
characterized Auer deference as a “presumption” that must be rebutted by the 
party arguing against an agency’s interpretation.224  It then listed the formal 
five-part test that Kisor created to determine whether or not to apply Auer 
deference to an ambiguous regulation.225 
The court first determined whether the regulation was genuinely 
ambiguous.226  The statute did not define a “written agreement.”227  The court 
considered two conflicting arguments:  (1) the plain language of the 
regulation suggested that parties must fully integrate the extension of credit 
in writing and (2) background principles of contract law only require the 
essential terms of the agreement to be in writing.228  Based solely on those 
two arguments, the court concluded that, “in light of those conflicting 
principles—the plain text of the regulation and the background of state law—
the term ‘written agreement’ is ambiguous.”229  The court did not 
independently analyze the regulation because, at first glance, it was 
ambiguous enough to warrant deference.230  This method of applying 
deference resembles Auer more than Seminole Rock.231 
After the court determined that the regulation was genuinely ambiguous, 
it had to determine whether the agency’s interpretation fell within the zone 
of ambiguity referenced in Kisor.232  The court held the Board’s 
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 222. Id. at 204. 
 223. Id. 
 224. See id. at 204 n.104. 
 225. Id. at 204–05. 
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 231. See supra Part I.A. 
 232. Wolfington, 935 F.3d at 205. 
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interpretation was reasonable because the Board relied on the regulation’s 
plain language.233  The plaintiff argued that the interpretation was 
unreasonable because it incentivized creditors to merely send confirmation 
e-mails or letters, thereby subverting the protections in the statute.234  But the 
court rejected this argument because (1) the plaintiff had no evidence that 
this occurred and (2) the “zone of ambiguity” from Kisor was broad enough, 
regardless, to include the Board’s interpretation.235 
B.  Rigorous Statutory Interpretation of Regulations Using Policy-Laden 
Terms 
On the other end of the spectrum of Kisor’s application are decisions that 
engage in thorough interpretation, even for terms like “appropriate” or 
“necessary.”  In Romero v. Barr,236 the Fourth Circuit considered whether 
the attorney general misread pertinent regulations in ruling that immigration 
judges (IJs) cannot administratively close cases, a practice dating back to the 
1980s.237 
The plaintiff, an undocumented immigrant, faced removal proceedings by 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2013.238  The plaintiff 
moved for the IJ to administratively close his case so that he could seek 
alternative immigration remedies (e.g., a provisional unlawful presence 
waiver).239  The IJ denied his motion.240  The Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA) reversed and then administratively closed his case.241  The DHS 
moved for reconsideration and, in the interim, the attorney general in 2017 
issued a precedential decision stating that no regulation grants IJs or the BIA 
authority to administratively close cases.242  Following this, the BIA granted 
the motion for reconsideration, dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal, and ordered 
his deportation.243  The Fourth Circuit reviewed whether the attorney general 
properly read the pertinent regulations.244 
Before the attorney general’s decision, IJs and the BIA administratively 
closed cases pursuant to two broad regulations.245  8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b) 
allows IJs to take “any action consistent with their authority” that is 
 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 205–06, 206 n.116. 
 236. 937 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 237. Administrative closure refers to when an IJ “temporarily removes a case from the 
active docket as a matter of ‘administrative convenience.’” Id. at 287.  The closure 
“temporarily pause[s] removal proceedings and places the case on hold, generally because 
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“appropriate and necessary for the disposition of such cases.”246  8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) allows the BIA to take “any action consistent with their 
authorities under the Act and the regulations that is appropriate and 
necessary for the disposition of such cases.”247 
In his precedential opinion, the attorney general held that neither of those 
regulations confer power upon IJs to administratively close cases.248  The 
attorney general concluded that the indefinite suspension of a case is not an 
action that is “appropriate and necessary for the disposition” of such a 
case.249  Moreover, the attorney general found that administrative closures 
dramatically increased between 2011 and 2017, eclipsing closures in the time 
period between 1980 and 2011.250  Lastly, the attorney general held that 
administrative closures are contrary to the public interest because “every 
delay works to the advantage of the deportable alien who wishes merely to 
remain in the United States.”251 
The Fourth Circuit read sections 1003.10(b) and 1003.1(d)(1)(ii) as 
expansively as the plain language allowed by using the traditional tools of 
statutory interpretation.252  The court interpreted “any action” in the 
regulations to include docket management, which included administrative 
closure.253  Therefore, since IJs and the BIA could take “any action,” the only 
question was whether the attorney general erred by concluding that 
administrative closure is never appropriate or necessary.254 
The court then considered whether to defer to the attorney general’s 
interpretation.255  The court cited Kisor only for the proposition that courts 
have the duty to independently analyze regulations before applying Auer 
deference.256  Rejecting the attorney general’s interpretation and not 
applying Auer deference, the court interpreted “appropriate and necessary” 
through a textual lens.257  The court noted that “appropriate and necessary” 
were terms that require a context-specific inquiry.258  If the court could find 
one situation where administrative closure was “appropriate” or “necessary,” 
in the court’s judgment, then administrative closure fit within text of the 
regulations.259  It then identified one context in which administrative closure 
could be appropriate or necessary and cited one case to illustrate its point.260  
 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. See generally In re Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271 (Att’y Gen. 2018). 
 249. Id. at 284 (“Administrative closure in fact is the antithesis of a final disposition.”). 
 250. Id. at 273. 
 251. See id. at 288–89 (quoting INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992)). 
 252. Romero, 937 F.3d at 292. 
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 255. Id. at 291–92. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. See id. at 293 (stating that words like “appropriate” and “necessary” are capacious). 
 259. Id. 
 260. See id. (citing In re Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688 (B.I.A. 2012)); see also id. at 294 
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In that case, a woman facing removal proceedings married a long-term 
permanent resident.261  Her husband applied for an adjustment to her 
residency status to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) 
and asked the IJ to stay the removal proceedings.262  The IJ granted 
continuances but each time she had to appear in front of the IJ, the USCIS 
had to delay the adjudication.263  Eventually, to expedite the process, the IJ 
administratively closed the case.264  Because administrative closure was 
appropriate and necessary in that case, the Fourth Circuit rejected the 
attorney general’s argument that administrative closure was not appropriate 
or necessary.265 
C.  Thorough Statutory Interpretation of Regulations That Do Not Use 
Policy Terms 
One decision interpreting Kisor thoroughly engaged in an interpretation of 
a regulation that did not involve policy considerations.  The Eleventh Circuit 
in Callahan v. United States Department of Health and Human Services266 
dealt with a regulatory ambiguity related to the requirements for altering the 
procedure for receiving livers for transplant.267  The court recognized that 
the “the nation’s policy for allocating donated livers hangs in the balance.”268 
In short, the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 requires the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to regulate the Organ 
Procurement and Transplant Network (OPTN),269 run by the United Network 
for Organ Sharing (UNOS), a private nonprofit responsible for the 
coordination of America’s organ transplant system.270  The HHS had 
promulgated regulations regarding the process the OPTN must follow to 
change the procedures for receiving a liver for transplant.271 
The current liver-allocation policy distributes livers based on two 
regions—eleven groups of states and “Donation Service Areas” (DSAs), 
which are fifty-eight irregular geographical locations.272  Because of 
criticisms from the DSAs, UNOS ventured to change the procedure for liver 
donations.273  A specialized committee within the UNOS presented two 
options for allocating livers and the UNOS board selected one of those 
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options.274  The proposed changed retained the use of DSAs but limited their 
effect on liver allocation.275 
Disappointed with the result, detractors of the new policy asked the HHS 
secretary to suspend it and instruct the UNOS to reconsider.276  The secretary 
then instructed the UNOS to adopt a policy that eliminated the use of 
DSAs.277 
The UNOS then proposed two new policies.278  Its advisory committee 
supported one policy and the board chose to implement the other.279  Again, 
detractors of the new policy asked the secretary to suspend the new policy.280  
The secretary refused, and hospitals and individuals waiting for liver 
transplants filed suit, principally arguing that the secretary violated pertinent 
regulations.281 
The regulation has two subsections that impose procedural 
requirements.282  Because the regulations are complicated and central to the 
case, they are reproduced here, as written in Callahan: 
(b) The [OPTN] Board of Directors shall:   
(1) Provide opportunity for the OPTN membership and other interested 
parties to comment on proposed policies and shall take into account the 
comments received in developing and adopting policies for 
implementation by the OPTN; and  
(2) Provide to the Secretary, at least 60 days prior to their proposed 
implementation, proposed policies it recommends to be enforceable 
under § 121.10 (including allocation policies).  These policies will not 
be enforceable until approved by the Secretary.  The Board of Directors 
shall also provide to the Secretary, at least 60 days prior to their 
proposed implementation, proposed policies on such other matters as 
the Secretary directs.  The Secretary will refer significant proposed 
policies to the Advisory Committee on Organ Transplantation 
established under § 121.12, and publish them in the Federal Register 
for public comment.  The Secretary also may seek the advice of the 
Advisory Committee on Organ Transplantation established under 
§ 121.12 on other proposed policies, and publish them in the Federal 
Register for public comment. . . .283 
The plaintiffs argued that the secretary violated the regulations because he 
did not refer this “significant proposed policy” to the advisory committee and 
publish the policy in the Federal Register.284  The plaintiff believed that a 
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policy which fundamentally transforms procedures for liver transplants is 
clearly “significant.”285 
The HHS did not disagree.286  Instead, it argued that the “significant 
review” requirement is only triggered (1) when the OPTN recommends that 
the policy should be enforceable or (2) when the policy relates to “such other 
matters as the Secretary directs.”287  Therefore, the sole interpretive question 
was this:  does the secretary need to refer all significant proposed policies to 
the Federal Register or only those that (1) the OPTN board recommends to 
be enforceable or (2) pertain to a matter the secretary directed?288 
The court cited Kisor for the proposition that agencies deserve deference 
only after courts “exhaust” the tools of statutory interpretation.289  Because 
the agency’s reading was the better one, it did not apply Auer deference.290  
It first analyzed the structure of the regulations.291  Based on the “scope-of-
subparts”292 canon, the court held that the “significant proposed policy” 
requirement triggers only when the circumstances in the same subsection 
occur.293 
After analyzing the regulation’s structure, the court focused on the text of 
subpart (2).294  The court held the subsection “acted like a funnel.”295  The 
first two sentences described two contexts, and the “significant proposed 
policy” requirement could only be triggered in those contexts.296  Therefore, 
the court concluded that the regulation was not ambiguous and held that the 
secretary did not need to refer the policy to the Federal Register.  In doing 
so, the court also raised and rejected the arguments the plaintiffs made, unlike 
the courts in Trawler and Wolfington.297 
IV.  RESOLUTION OF DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS OF KISOR 
In this Part, this Note explains how the courts in Trawler, Wolfington, and 
Romero misapplied Kisor in different ways.  The courts in Trawler and 
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Wolfington underanalyzed the respective regulations and, by doing so, 
ignored Justice Kagan’s prescription that courts must engage in thorough 
analysis before concluding that a regulation is genuinely ambiguous.  Then, 
this Note explains why the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Callahan is a model 
for how lower courts should interpret Kisor.  This Note explains why lower 
courts still employ a disuniform application of Auer deference, even though 
the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the doctrine in Kisor.  Finally, this 
Note offers its own interpretation for the best reading of Kisor. 
A.  The Eastern District of North Carolina and the Third Circuit 
Improperly Underanalyzed the Respective Regulations 
1.  The Eastern District of North Carolina 
The court’s primary error in Trawler was that it required the plaintiff to 
“unambiguously foreclose” the agency’s interpretation of its own 
regulation.298  Kisor held that, to determine whether a regulation is genuinely 
ambiguous, courts must rigorously interpret the regulation as if there is no 
deference regime to rely on.299  For a normal interpretative question, one side 
does not need to convince the judge that their interpretation is 
“unambiguously” correct but only that it is more favorable, no matter how 
slightly.300  Therefore, the existence of the deference regime influenced how 
the court performed its regulatory analysis. 
Moreover, the court at best modestly engaged in regulatory 
interpretation.301  The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument in one sentence, 
simply because the regulations did not cross-reference the regulations that 
the agency cited.302  The court did not analyze the regulation’s text, structure, 
or history and did not use any other interpretive canon.303  It did not try to 
analyze the regulation cited by the agency in conjunction with those cited by 
the plaintiff because even doing so would not “unambiguously foreclose” the 
agency’s position.304 
But, as stated, Kisor requires judges to get into the weeds of regulatory 
interpretation if doing so would reveal a legal answer to an interpretive 
problem.305  The Trawler court’s unwillingness to do so suggests it 
misunderstood the new requirements that Kisor set forth to find that a 
regulation is genuinely ambiguous. 
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2.  The Third Circuit 
The Third Circuit similarly failed to analyze Regulation Z.306  First, it 
concluded that the agency’s interpretation of the regulation deserved 
deference before it ever analyzed the regulation itself.307  As in Trawler, this 
ignores the responsibility of lower courts to interpret the regulation as if no 
deference regime existed.308 
But even worse, the Third Circuit did not attempt to interpret the 
regulation.309  It simply concluded that the regulation was ambiguous 
because the statute did not define a “written agreement” and there were two 
competing presumptions raised by the litigants.310  In Kisor, Justice Kagan 
acknowledged that the practice of deferring to the agency’s position without 
an independent analysis of the regulation’s meaning justified Kisor’s gripe 
with Auer deference.311  Yet, that is the exact practice the Third Circuit 
employed in this case.312  Surely, the practice that Kisor identified as 
justifying recalcitrance to Auer deference cannot be the practice that Kisor 
endorsed.  The Third Circuit did not analyze the regulation “as if it had no 
agency to rely on.”313 
That practice can be characterized as “front-end ambiguity.”314  This 
occurs when a court determines, just by comparing the competing regulatory 
interpretations advanced by the litigants, a regulation is ambiguous.315  In 
this scenario, the hypothetical court does not embark on an interpretive 
journey because the mere existence of two different arguments suffices to 
create the ambiguity required for Auer deference.  This normally occurs 
because a court anticipates a difficult interpretive problem.  This is distinct 
from “back-end ambiguity,”316 where a court concludes a regulation is 
ambiguous only after it attempts to interpret the regulation and it cannot come 
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to a definite answer about the regulation’s meaning.  Justice Kagan 
repudiated front-end ambiguity and instead held that a regulation can only be 
genuinely ambiguous after the court tries to interpret the regulation but 
cannot come to an answer.317  Yet, the Third Circuit erroneously adopted the 
front-end model. 
The Third Circuit also held that the agency’s interpretation of the 
regulation satisfied step two of the Kisor test because the agency’s 
interpretation was in the “zone of ambiguity.”318  But Justice Kagan made 
clear that independent regulatory interpretation defines the contours of the 
“zone of ambiguity” in step one.319  Because the court made no independent 
step-one analysis, it improperly analyzed the agency’s interpretation in step 
two. 
When courts defer to an agency without performing independent 
regulatory analysis, they relinquish judicial power to the executive branch.320  
Justice Kagan held that Auer does not violate separation of powers principles 
because the limits she placed on Auer deference empower courts to “retain a 
firm grip on the interpretive function.”321  But it is hard to imagine how 
courts retain that firm grip when they, like the Third Circuit, choose to defer 
to an agency without independently analyzing the regulation. 
Even so, the Third Circuit did correctly interpret Kisor to require respect 
for an agency’s policy discretion.322  In Kisor, Justice Kagan justified Auer 
on those precise grounds.323  But Kisor limits the situations where agencies 
receive deference, and the Third Circuit did not faithfully consider whether 
the first test was met—whether the regulation was genuinely ambiguous.324 
B.  The Fourth Circuit, in Determining the Regulations Were 
Unambiguous, Invaded the Attorney General’s Policy Discretion 
The Fourth Circuit applied Kisor incorrectly for the opposite reason than 
the courts in Trawler and Wolfington:  it prevented the attorney general from 
exercising his policy discretion.325  Words like “appropriate” and 
“necessary” in regulations are policy-laden terms, and those terms rarely 
have a “plain meaning,” as Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence made clear.326  
When courts use plain meaning to disagree with an agency as to whether an 
action is “appropriate” or “necessary,” that disagreement resembles policy 
more than law.  And that disagreement is more appropriate in State Farm 
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review than Auer deference.  To borrow a phrase used by Justice Kagan, the 
regulations in Romero sounded more in “policy than in law.”327  That is, 
“appropriate” and “necessary” are not terms subject to a textual gloss.328 
Factually, the attorney general’s reading of the regulation was itself 
grounded in policy.329  His precedential decision concluded that 
administrative closures delay removal proceedings and benefit 
undocumented immigrants and the use of closures skyrocketed after 2011.330  
Moreover, the attorney general pointed out that most administratively closed 
cases are never reopened, which effectively allows undocumented 
immigrants to permanently stay in the country.331  In response, the Fourth 
Circuit never considered these points raised by the attorney general.332  It 
merely identified one instance in which the practice was helpful—where an 
undocumented immigrant, during deportation proceedings, applied for a 
visa.333  Based on that narrow situation, the court concluded that 
administrative closure could theoretically be “appropriate” or “necessary” 
textually.334 
However, the attorney general acknowledged that, in limited instances, 
administrative closure could be helpful, but that the cost of the procedure 
outweighed its benefits.335  This resembles the cost-benefit analysis that 
Justice Kagan referenced in Kisor regarding the issue of comparable lines of 
sight for the disabled in arenas.336  There, the Court allowed the pertinent 
agency to engage in its own cost-benefit analysis rather than textually 
interpreting the word “comparable.”337  But the Fourth Circuit disallowed the 
attorney general from doing the same.  Just because administrative closure 
could possibly be helpful in one scenario does not mean that the existence of 
the practice, on balance, is appropriate or necessary.  The attorney general 
had to consider the costs of administrative closure (e.g., indefinite suspension 
of cases) and the benefits of the practice (e.g., the narrow context cited by the 
Fourth Circuit).338  By replacing that cost-benefit analysis with textual 
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analysis, the Fourth Circuit usurped the policy discretion invested in the 
attorney general by Congress.339 
C.  The Eleventh Circuit Properly Toed the Line Between Respect for 
Policy Discretion and Rigorous Statutory Interpretation 
Without question, the Eleventh Circuit confronted “hard interpretive 
conundrums” relating to “complex rules.”340  In response, it analyzed the 
regulation’s text, structure, and purpose to come to an answer about its 
meaning.341  Therefore, it faithfully followed Kisor in that it did not 
“reflexively” apply Auer deference—it instead followed the “reviewing and 
restraining functions” of the judiciary.342  By avoiding a reflexive application 
of Auer deference, the Eleventh Circuit avoided the very practice that gave 
James Kisor the “grist” for his complaints about Auer deference.343 
Moreover, in rejecting the application of Auer deference, the Eleventh 
Circuit did not encroach upon the HHS’s policy discretion.  After all, the 
regulation covered “significant proposed policies.”344  As in Romero, it may 
have been improper for the Eleventh Circuit to embark on a textual analysis 
of the term “significant,” as that term is really a placeholder for the agency’s 
policy discretion.345  But the court did not decide whether or not the proposed 
policy was “significant”; instead, it decided under what circumstances the 
secretary must refer significant proposed policies to the Federal Register for 
public comment.346  This was a purely “legal” question and not an ad hoc 
judicial determination of whether the proposed policy was “significant.”347 
D.  Explaining Kisor’s Divergent Interpretation:  A Problem with Auer 
Itself 
This Note highlighted different ways that courts have applied Auer 
deference in the months following Kisor.348  Some courts still reflexively 
apply Auer deference, while others have not heeded Kisor’s holding 
regarding respect for an agency’s policy discretion.349  This section offers 
explanations for the divergence among courts and offers an opinion for the 
best way to read Kisor. 
Kisor, and the larger issue of deference to administrative agencies, will 
always be subject to disparate application because of two competing values:  
the duty of the judiciary to “say what the law is” and Congress’s intent to 
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2020] AUER 2.0 2041 
delegate policymaking authority to an agency.  Courts that do not rigorously 
interpret a regulation before applying deference tend only to cite propositions 
from Kisor that reflect congressional intent.  For example, the Third Circuit’s 
opinion in Wolfington, perhaps the opinion with the lowest threshold for 
ambiguity, only cited references to Kisor’s holding about policy 
judgments.350  In contrast, the Fourth Circuit in Romero v. Barr focused on 
quoting and referencing the portions of Kisor that prescribe thorough 
statutory interpretation.351  The court never referenced the parts of Kisor that 
counsel respect and deference to an agency’s policy decisions.352  Moreover, 
as a matter of common sense, Kisor is difficult to interpret because each of 
the three concurring opinions offers a different opinion as to the meaning of 
the majority and plurality opinions.353 
Many issues that reach the Supreme Court involve a doctrine that has two 
or more competing values.  But Auer deference is unique because the 
competing values determine whether to apply the doctrine, not the content of 
the doctrine itself.354  The first step to determine whether to apply the 
doctrine rests on a subjective determination—whether a regulation is 
“ambiguous.”355  And, as stated, the Supreme Court has never tried to define 
“ambiguity” for these purposes. 
This problem, the lack of a definition for ambiguity, is the ultimate barrier 
to an effective deference regime.  Even if all courts heeded the instruction in 
Kisor to empty their legal toolkits, there is no guidance on what to do after 
the toolkits are empty.  Even if courts heed the new limitations on Auer 
deference that Kisor imposed, the lack of definition of “ambiguity” will still 
prevent the uniform application of Auer deference.  As long as the Court 
remains silent on this issue, litigants can expect unpredictability in the 
application of Auer deference.356 
E.  Toeing the Line:  The Proper Way to Interpret Kisor 
How then shall we interpret Kisor?  Admittedly, Justice Kagan repeatedly 
cabined the decision’s change on Auer deference.357  But the fundamental 
phrase from the opinion—“genuine ambiguity”—is unprecedented in case 
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law about Auer deference.358  The Court’s iteration of Auer in Kisor 
fundamentally shifts from the iteration of the rule in Decker.359  Justice 
Anthony Kennedy stated that Auer deference can apply even if the agency’s 
interpretation is not the best.360  But the Court in Kisor stated that Auer 
deference is warranted only if there is “no single right answer.”361  Logically, 
if Kisor held that Auer deference is only appropriate if there is no right 
answer to an interpretative question, then a court cannot defer to an agency 
if the agency’s interpretation is not the best one.362  Therefore, it is best to 
conceive Kisor as a shift from the iteration in Decker to some extent.363 
But the question is to what extent Kisor shifts from the iteration in Decker.  
If Auer deference is only applied when a court is otherwise convinced that 
the agency’s interpretation is superior, then it makes no difference in any 
case.364  For Auer deference to have vitality, it must be applied in situations 
where a court recognizes that the agency’s interpretation is inferior to that of 
its adversary.365  It would be improper to interpret Kisor to limit Auer 
deference to a meaningless doctrine after the Court took the opportunity to 
justify and uphold it.366 
The best reading of Kisor is one that modifies the rule from Decker to the 
extent that the agency’s interpretation is grounded in legal interpretation.  If 
an agency has an inferior legal interpretation of a regulation, courts should 
never defer to it, even if the interpretive process leading to the right answer 
is long and exacting.367  However, if an agency’s interpretation of a 
regulation is based in policy,368 and the policy it advances seems worse or 
disfavorable to the policy advanced by its adversary, courts should 
nonetheless defer to the agency.  An interpretation of Kisor needs to reconcile 
the need for rigorous interpretation of regulations with the need to give 
appropriate deference to an agency’s policy discretion.369  This 
understanding of Kisor respects the distinction Justice Kagan reinforced 
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between law and policy while retaining the doctrine’s vitality and 
relevance.370 
Moreover, this interpretation avoids the problem of the term “ambiguous” 
having no definition.  Since Auer deference will never be applied to legal 
questions, courts will return to their normal interpretive function.  Normally, 
courts use the tools of statutory interpretation to determine the meaning of a 
statute or regulation.  They do not have to decide the overarching question of 
whether the provision being interpreted is ambiguous.371  Nor should they.  
The duty of the judiciary is to “say what the law is,” not to say “whether or 
not the law is ambiguous.”372  Instead, if the preferability of an agency’s 
policy choice is ambiguous, courts should freely defer to them. 
This interpretation also fits quite neatly with the cases previously 
discussed.  The Eastern District of North Carolina and the Third Circuit 
improperly deferred to legal arguments, while the Eleven Circuit performed 
its own independent legal analysis.373  The Fourth Circuit refused to defer to 
policy arguments, which should receive the most deference under Kisor.374 
What constitutes “law” versus “policy” is where the struggle in lower 
courts should exist because, while Justice Kagan proffered that distinction, 
she offered no guiding principle for the two concepts.375  The distinction is 
easier to understand in theory than in application.  After all, modes of 
statutory interpretation include considering a statute or regulation’s policy 
purpose.  And Justice Kavanaugh’s suggestion that courts should give policy 
discretion to agencies for regulations that use broad terms like “reasonable” 
is a useful starting point but not the entire answer.376  When a court 
determines whether to apply deference, it must consider the fine distinction 
between policy and law without a clear definition from the Supreme Court 
about their meanings. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue of whether to apply Auer deference will continue to plague 
courts and litigants alike.  While Kisor presented an opportunity to clarify 
the doctrine, early decisions interpreting the decision cast that hope into 
doubt.  That is because lower courts, to uniformly apply deference regimes, 
need precedent on (1) how much ambiguity is necessary for a regulation to 
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be “genuinely ambiguous” and (2) the distinction between law and policy.  
Without further input from the Supreme Court on those two critical issues, 
Auer deference will be an uncontrollable doctrine that perpetually subjects 
litigants to uncertainty. 
